Gödel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing that the contradiction that emerges at the end should be redirected to refute this initial assumption rather than the completeness of number theory 1 Section 1 -Introduction It's the signature move of Gödel's argument to establish, based on the eponymous Gödel numbering, an ingenious mapping into number theory. But a mapping always has two sides, a preimage and an image, and we need to be as clear about the first as we are about the second. So what, exactly, is being mapped into number theory ?
number theory to be defined. The most important relation for the argument being provability, all the other relations only serve to support it.
Let BASE stand for any first-order successor-based theory that contains Robinson's Q. BASE could be number theory, or any suitably weaker subtheory. The exact nature of BASE is irrelevant.
What we need, then, for Gödel's argument to take off -or at least to take off in a clean, purely syntactic framework -is, minimally, this: Definition 1.3: META is a first-order theory that is meta to BASE and contains a predicate PROV(x) that directly defines provability for BASE.
A distinct concept calls for distinct terminology. We say directly defines in order to emphasise again that the strings of the base theory appear in META nakedly, untouched by any encoding. Strings come just as they are. Literally literal.
For now, to maintain the symmetry between preimage and image, we shall limit the search for META to first-order theories. We promise to circle back to this limitation before the end.
The plan for the remainder of the article is as follows:
(Section 2) Examine META, the distilled preimage (Section 3) Examine concatenation, the crucial function in META (Section 4) Build modelling transformations between META and BASE (Section 5) Recover a form of Gödel's Theorem (Section 6) Address the consequences of the restated Theorem Section 2 -Building META This section examines the anatomy of META, the theory that is meant to constitute the preimage.
For the avoidance of any misunderstanding, META is not and does not pretend to be 'the meta theory' in which the argument is conducted. META is something much simpler: a fully formal string theory serving as the preimage for a mapping that the largely informal meta theory is used to describe. The language of META is first-order logic; the language of the background 'theory' is more or less lightly formalised English.
Definition 2.1: Let C be the first-order language (with identity) consisting of a single binary function c(x,y), and for constants, strings over a given finite alphabet Σ.
The next definition refers, scrupulously, to 'predicate expressions' because 'predicate' can shade into assuming the existence of an extension, which our side wants to avoid prejudging. The choice of the word 'class' is similarly motivated.
Definition 2.2: Let C
Δ be the class of predicate expressions in C that use at most bounded quantification.
The natural model for the ordering relation in the quantifiers is string length.
Proposition 2.3:
For META to exist, it is sufficient that there is a first-order theory T that
(1) contains concatenation (and string identity) (2) gives < a finite definition: For any string s over Σ,
where the si are all strings over Σ shorter than s (3) decides all predicates 1 P in C Δ , so that for all strings s over Σ,
T |-P(s) or T |-P(s)
Condition (1) requires the meaning of predicate expressions to be anchored by the c-function. What precisely is entailed by capturing concatenation will be the topic of the next section. For the duration of this section we will follow the example of all the textbook arguments for Gödel's Theorem and take native concatenation for granted. We will assume that the c-function behaves as expected, that it concatenates unencoded literals in just the way a naïve user would expect it to.
With the native c-function a given, the remaining content of the proposition covers well-trodden ground. We need only sketch a proof.
The intermediate step required is an expression PROOF(x,y) that formalises the string relation 'x is a proof sequence for the sentence y'. As first shown by Gödel himself, there exists a predicate PROOF*(n,m) in number theory that, as far as concatenation extends, could serve as a homomorphic image for PROOF. Moreover, PROOF*(n,m) would be primitive recursive, and readily decidable. So we could simply argue that if PROOF is definable indirectly as an arithmetic relation, then it must be even more easily definable directly, without the extra complication of an encoding.
If we were, somewhat redundantly, to start building PROOF anyway, three types of relations are necessary: String identity, pattern search and recursive construction.
Following the textbooks, we shall assume string identity alongside with concatenation.
Pattern search involves checking whether a string is composed of various independently defined components. A good example would be the substitution function. Pattern search is clearly bounded in the length of the inputs, and available in C Δ as long as the definitions of the components are available.
A typical example of a predicate required for resolving pattern searches would be CONTAINS(x,y), which can be seen to be in C Δ .
For the third type of relation, the recursive construction of formulas, we require:
Definition [2.4]:
A string predicate P is said to be definable by primitive recursion if can be given by an axiom of this form:
where A(x) is a unary in C Δ , and B(x,xi) is n+1-ary in C Δ .
A(x) is the seed clause, equivalent to the ground level of induction. B is the construction clause that describes how to get from one stage of iterative construction to the next.
Lemma [2.5]:
Theories T, as defined in 2.3, decide primitive recursive string predicates closed by a string s.
The finite definability of < reduces primitive recursion to C Δ . This would only be surprising if it were not the case. Another sketch will do for a proof.
For illustration, we will use the example of NUMERAL. As a concession to readability it is supposed that the base theory writes 0'' ...
''' for successor, and not, as it should, s(s( ... s(0) ... )).
With A(x) := x = 0, B(x,x1) := c(x1,') = x, we have NUMERAL(x) :=
By definition, NUMERAL(s) unspools into:
Let's say that we start with the list x1 < s  ( x1 = s1  x1 = s2  …  x1 = sm ). Since the inequality in xi+1<xi is strict, with each unspooling the longest strings on the list get cut, so that the list shortens progressively, and will eventually be empty. Once xi+1<xi is reached we can strike the recursive predicate letter. Of the last unspooling only the seed clause remains. We are left with a pure C Δ sentence, which by assumption is decidable.
For NUMERAL especially there does exist a much simpler, closed form definition, based on describing NUMERAL as ' begins with 0, otherwise consists only of ' '. As a matter of fact, BEGINS_WITH(x,y) and CONSISTS_ONLY_OF(x,y) are both in C Δ .
In the general case, however, we cannot dispense with definition by primitive recursion as closed form definitions directly from C Δ are more elusive.
With clauses A and B that are a little more complicated, but still either contained in C Δ , or in turn definable by primitive recursion, we can proceed to define concepts like VARIABLE, TERM, PREDICATE, SENTENCE. The relation of being an immediate consequence requires another (elaborate but manageable) pattern search. Putting it all together, PROOF is built.
So assuming only that the meaning of predicate expressions from C is anchored by concatenation, PROV(x) := y PROOF(y,x) will directly define provability.
To be clear, definability as used in the proposition is not intended to be definability according to this conventional definition: Definition 2.6: A predicate P from an arithmetic theory AR definestraditional a preformal string property PROP, if for all a*, g an encoding function,
First of all, our side does not want to encode. Instead, as already practised above, META means to formalise facts about naked literals. Hence our g is absent / the identical function. (To avoid confusion, we might choose to change the formatting for strings from the base theory, to bold or in some other uniform way, but that's it. No character replacement, and certainly no numeric encoding.) Second, the way in which the conventional definition includes unexamined properties, along with "structures" that are semiformal at best, is profoundly unsatisfactory. It would be irresponsible to put any trust into unformalised ideas about string properties unless and until they have been refined into the predicates of an actual theory. The conventional definition has it backwards. One should not be referring theories to informal notions as the standard from which to take directions. Our side wants theories to set the standard, and eliminate informal notions like PROP, as well as the accompanying truth talk.
Concatenation-based string theories represent much the clearest expression, the least slippery grip we have on the concept of a string property. String properties are so obviously at home there that it would in many ways be better to turn the definition talk around and say that the existence of a predicate in a string theory is what makes a well-defined string predicate. The predicates of string theories would then "define" by definition.
A concatenation-based theory like META does not have to prove that it defines string properties;
canonically defining these properties is what it can be assumed to do by definition, or quasi-axiomatic convention.
With the direction of definition reversed, the arrow of implication reverses, too. Before we had, for sentences φ of the base theory,
No more g, and everything underpinned by thoroughly formal definitions. There are two clauses because if we can assume that c works at all, then it will also work for the negated predicate.
Later on, when ready to start mapping to BASE, we will be redefining representstraditional as:
So eventually, we will get BASE |-PROV*(g(φ)) back, but will have eliminated all informal notions.
Definition 2.7:
A first-order theory is said to be strictly axiomatisable if is it axiomatised by a finite number of sentences or schemes such that any scheme can be summarised by a single sentence in higher-order logic.
The single sentence from higher-order logic provides a pattern against which axioms can be checked.
Clearly, Peano arithmetic is strictly axiomatisable -its scheme is summarised in second-order logic.
For naturally occurring theories likely to become relevant to the argument, including of course Q, the definitions of 'strictly axiomatisable' and 'recursively axiomatisable' are coextensive. The adjusted definition is intended only to exclude artificial axiomatisations by pure enumeration or infinite indexing, which recursive axiomatisability might allow through.
Corollary 2.8: For any (consistent) strictly axiomatisable theory
Definition 2.9: A theory that contains concatenation is said to directly express any string relation that it decides.
META, if it were complete, would directly expresses provability for BASE.
Note how from these two definitions
by cutting out META in the middle (essentially by assuming its completeness), one could obtain
which, by adding completeness for BASE, immediately yields
This, in a nutshell, is the traditional argument: A mapping of BASE into itself, achieved by making inarticulate assumptions about a less than formal META. The way consistency and completeness assumptions for META entered into the argument was through extensional semantics, by taking for granted that the arbitrary sets of strings or informal string properties used as inputs to the mapping were "real" to begin with. In order to be available for mapping, the inputs must at least be possible and definite: Possible was presumed through the existence of an (intuited) model, which can be thought of as the semantic form of consistency; definiteness was given by excluded middle, which is the semantic form of completeness.
Section 3 -On concatenation
In the previous section we have shown that the existence of a meta string theory that directly defines provability reduces to the existence of a theory that contains concatenation.
Speaking of concatenation, we have to be clear which form of concatenation we mean. There are two related but essentially different forms of concatenation. Both have their origin in the naïve concept of concatenation, but they do address different aspects.
The first form of concatenation is implicit. It is well-known and well-understood. Concatenation is formalised as an implicit binary function not unlike the Peano successor function. A typical sentence of such a theory would be the axiom of associativity: c(x,c(y,z)) = c(c(x,y),z). An example of a weak theory of implicit concatenation, with most of the axioms going back to Tarski, is contained in Grzegorczyk [2005] . Stronger versions add an induction scheme, where the successor equivalent of a string is the string extended by one letter. The strongest version is defined, just as it is for arithmetic, by its second-order axiom of induction.
Implicit concatenation theories are characterised by the fact that they allow for only finitely many constants, one for each letter of their alphabet. Let's say that there are only two letters, a and b. The string "ab" would then not be a term of the theory. Implicit concatenation theories are therefore unable to make, let alone decide, statements of the form "c(a,b) = ab".
One could paraphrase this by saying that implicit concatenation theories express naïve concatenation only up to typographical permutation. Implicit concatenation only captures structural properties that are independent of an instantiation in concrete strings. It is not able to prove or refute that the concatenation of two given concrete strings is a third concrete string.
The second form of concatenation is much less well understood. We will call it extensional concatenation. It can be thought of as implicit concatenation made concrete, or fully interpreted.
People, and mathematicians especially, use it fluently, and daily; but very rarely do they stop to examine it.
Suppose we start again with only two letters, and want a language that will prove all and only the 'true' atomic concatenation statements (as naïvely understood) about these letters. For letters a and b that would mean that the language should prove e.g. c(a,b) = ab and c(a,ab) = aab, and disprove c(a,a) = a. There is no way of avoiding the use of extensional concatenation in meta arguments, as there is no way of talking about the strings of an underlying theory without it. Given the use, we would want to know that the naïve concept of extensional concatenation can be trusted. The prime means of demonstrating a clear understanding, and inspire trust, would be to present a consistent formalisation.
Due to reservations about recursion theory, and more important, to fit underneath META, we expect extensional concatenation to be formalisable, and decidable, in predicate logic instead:
Gödel's Assumption (a little less rough) [3.2]: Concatenation is formalisable. In other words, there exists a theory CONCAT containing a binary function c that correctly expresses extensional concatenation for atomic sentences over a finite alphabet , so that for all s,t,u  *, CONCAT |-c(s,t) = u iff u is the concatenation of s and t.
As a ubiquitous meta function, it is extremely easy for informal uses of extensional concatenation to intrude into an argument. The best protection against such intrusions is what we are already planning to do: Restate the preimage as a theory, and the entire interpretation process as a mapping from theory to theory. Reconstruct the argument on a purely syntactic basis, as an interpretation free of semantics. To that end, we will now try to formalise extensional concatenation. This will feel awkward as it is not something the predicate calculus is designed to do. The very awkwardness will show that the protections are working.
Gödel's Assumption, as stated, is infuriatingly vague. 'Correctly expresses' is just a pretentious way of saying 'behaves as one would naïvely expect concatenation to behave'. The phrase 'is the concatenation of' assumes command of the very thing we want do more about than just assume. But the task we face is tricky: How does one articulate the inarticulate ? How do we even know that there is something there to be expressed ?
In order to get a firmer grip let's try Definition 3.3: CONCATn is a consistent, complete and strictly axiomatisable first-order theory that directly defines concatenation for strings up to length n over a finite alphabet Σ.
Writing out examples of CONCATn is straightforward if tedious. To illustrate, we present CONCAT2, a theory consisting of six constants, a single predicate letter C, and the following axioms:
(As the assumption that concatenation should be a total function has become problematic, we switch to predicate-style notation to accommodate partial functions.)
There is an explicit, pre-declared finite domain. The theory CONCAT2 is evidently decidable. The first axiom, by limiting the domain to a finite number of explicit strings, ensures that quantifiers can be eliminated in favour of atomic statements, in a finite number of steps. Axioms (A2) -(A6) together make sure that the list of atomic statements in C to be checked against is exhaustive, and in turn quickly decided. Atomic statements in = are resolvable into finite combinations of atomic statements in C and equalities over letters only. Last, atomic (in)equalities over letters are decided with the help of (A7).
This in itself is
It seems reasonable to grant the intelligibility of the idea of constructing theories CONCATn on roughly this pattern even for n larger than the physical capacity of any human or computer. As categorical theories that directly define, the CONCATn perfectly embody the concept they present. In their albeit limited realms, they are concatenation.
There is only one final complication: the self-reflexivity of extensional concatenation. Due to its circular nature, the construction of CONCAT2 we gave does not, strictly speaking, prove the existence of languages CONCATn: The ability to construct CONCATn presupposes string handling abilities tantamount to CONCATm, for some m > n. It therefore seems preferable to phrase the conclusion that these theories exist not as a proposition, but a postulate. Moreover, to avoid the implication that an infinite index i: n → CONCATn exists, we are going to phrase the postulate as a scheme with parameter
M:
Postulate Scheme [3.4]: For n < M, CONCATn exists.
Let M be a massively large finite number. For n < M, we concede that CONCATn exists. The point of M is not make a specific number the limit, but to make it clear that there always is a limit. Every introduction of CONCATn into a derivation comes with a side constraint that n < M. Let's call M the perimeter of concatenation. Inside the perimeter, everything works as (naïvely) expected. Most of the time, work goes on normally, and the perimeter can be ignored. Only when a contradiction arises is the perimeter constraint activated to absorb it. Sometimes, the argument can be repaired by shifting to a larger perimeter, M+X. So for example, a bounded diagonal argument that produces an element provably unlike any inside the perimeter can be repaired by shifting to a larger perimeter that includes the new element. At other times, the argument cannot be repaired. Diagonal arguments based on an infinite index cannot be restated to be compatible with a perimeter constraint. Such arguments can only be made by appealing to a more powerful postulate.
With the theories CONCATn in mind we are now able to clarify
Definition [3.5]:
A first-order theory, styled CONCAT, is said to contain concatenation if it contains a function c that satisfies the following definition scheme with parameter M:
For n < M, for all strings s, t, u in Σ n CONCAT |-c(s,t) = u iff CONCATn |-C(s,t,u)
We keep c as a function on the left-hand side in order to ensure continued compatibility, and interchangeability of predicates, with theories of implicit concatenation.
Gödel's Assumption (clarified) [3.6]: CONCAT exists.
What began as something slippery and semantic -a claim about the legitimacy of using extensional concatenation in meta arguments -has now been turned into something purely syntactic, and thereby, unambiguous. Deciding atomic statements the same way as the theories CONCATn is a pretty minimalist definition of what extensional concatenation should mean. Whatever one takes extensional concatenation to mean, however one tries to pin it down to a precise meaning, it is hard to see how any proposed formalisation of concatenation could be considered successful without meeting at least this lenient condition. As a formal statement of Gödel's Assumption it seems more than fair.
Note that there is no important difference between primitive recursive and general recursive predicates when it comes to interpretability. Infinite extensional concatenation is already required to interpret primitive recursive predicates. Required, in fact, already for bounded predicates.
Let P(x) := y≤x Q(y) be from C Δ . Evaluating P(s) for some string s requires (at least) CONCAT|s|.
Evaluating P(x) for all strings over Σ requires greater than finite reach, which is to say: it would require CONCAT. Even expressions from C Δ could only live up to their intended meaning if they are supported from below by full, unbounded concatenation.
Only finite predicates -those with at most a finite number of either positive or negative instances -can fit inside a perimeter, to be decided inside one CONCATn. General primitive recursive predicates cannot.
Thus only finite predicates are interpretable without Gödel's Assumption. Without CONCAT, there would be nothing to interpret arithmetic predicates as, even bounded ones.
What is to stop us from disposing of Gödel's Assumption by simply proving it, delivering a theory that contains concatenation ? Can it really be so difficult to define and axiomatise extensional concatenation ? Well, it's not so simple, it turns out.
Concatenation is an unusual function. To appreciate just how unusual, observe that the candidate that first comes to mind when one thinks about compacting the lists of explicit extensional values into a single axiom -"x,y c(x,y) = xy" -is certainly not well-formed as a first-order formula, or indeed in any conventional logic. Given how it allows quantification to reach inside terms, inside the "xy", in a way that mashes meta and object level, it would not be surprising if the leading candidate for Axiom of Concatenation, once plausibly fleshed out into a non-standard theory, would turn out to be inconsistent 3 . Is this the notion that the average logician unconsciously applies in appealing to their intuition of concatenation ?
Without the trick of quantifying inside terms, CONCAT is in some trouble. The second idea that comes to mind -interpreting xy as an (implicit) functional x*y, or even more explicitly, c*(x,y) -, also fails. It leads to an immediate regress in the definition: c(x,y) = c*(x,y) is not helpful. Thanks to the stubborn rigour of the predicate calculus, the informal meta function of concatenation that we must inevitably make use of to operate any theory is not so easily repurposed for undercover work on the inside of an axiom.
So it seems that in order to meet the demands of expressing the concept of extensional concatenation, (This is perhaps even easier to see in predicate-style notation, C(0,',0'). When functionals have been eliminated altogether, there is no doubt that 0' can only be a primitive term.) While manageable over finite domains, and perfectly workable for the definition of the theories CONCATn, when CONCAT tries to gather all the finite theories together, it has to start dealing with infinitely many primitive terms simultaneously. All of them must be handled, and fixed in their meanings by syntactic means only.
Formally, 0' is a constant, a primitive term not analysable by its own language. A single symbol, without interior divisions. At the same time, the definition of constants as strings over Σ presupposes a shadow theory (the residual 'meta theory') that analyses them as non-primitive functional terms in concatenation. But we cannot forever rely on outsourcing work to the shadow theory, formalisation is not complete without knowing that we retain the capacity to internalise the work done by any actively involved third parties. The challenge for CONCAT, in a way, is to try and catch its own shadow. Put less poetically, in the mundane terms of computing: 0', as a single, undivided symbol, must have its own entry on the code table. This is a problem, as for all real-world computers the code table is finite.
Is the following operation computable ? Challenged by three objects, decide whether one is the concatenation of the other two. The hard part is formatting the problem, recognising the objects as strings. The inputs have to be parsed, someone or something has to break through the opacity of strings presented as a single symbol, and delineate letters. The rest, once parsing is complete, is stupendously easy.
At first, it may be difficult to see what the problem is. The hard part may not seem hard at all. Parsing is something that everyone who has learned to read an alphabetic language does involuntarily, unprompted. One hardly notices the effort, and finds it much more difficult to stop with the parsing than to parse. But stop is what we must do in order to be able to examine the operation, and really understand what is involved in extensional concatenation.
Once letters have been delineated, answering the challenge is as simple as deciding sentences inside
CONCATn. Yet parsing is not equivalent to deciding sentences in CONCATn, it is equivalent to setting up the CONCATn.
Deciding sentences in CONCATn is trivial. Setting up any one theory CONCATn is still almost trivial. A general mechanism for setting up all CONCATn is no longer trivial. It would, in fact, require infinitary powers.
The crux is to get from this
and vice versa.
Evidently, a machine able to effect concatenation and its inverse for all strings over a finite Σ would have to be able to accept and process infinitely many distinct string objects. Translated into the language of Turing machines, CONCAT presupposes the ability of accepting infinitely many distinct symbols on a single square of tape. According to the standard definition of computability CONCAT is thereby disqualified as a computable function.
A theorem that takes in an uncomputable function, ready-made, is not going to have any difficulty proving uncomputability: Showing that functions derived from CONCAT are uncomputable, while true, fails to show anything about the computability of unrelated functions.
To complete one possible definition of META, we require the axiomatisation of an ordering relation that meshes with concatenation in that it contains the partial ordering by string inclusion, i.e. c(x,y) = z  ( x < z  y < z ), and is just strong enough to prove the finite definability of x ≤ s (Condition (2) in Proposition 2.3). Let's call this theory O, for Order, and a family resemblance to Q.
The purpose of O is to enable a primitive extensional form of induction that allows for primitive recursive predicates to be defined. O, one might say, is poor man's induction 4 .
There are various ways of giving O, none particularly difficult Having established the preimage, and knowing the image to be a first-order arithmetic theory, we can move on to mappings between them. All the assumptions are in place for us to be able to connect META with BASE by way of two lemmas.
assumption of completeness for theories equipollent to number theory, e.g. number theory itself and comparably strong concatenation theories. Because for as long as we are also unable to prove the assumption of completeness -and it would be unrealistic to expect that to change -no hard contradiction will emerge. While the choice stands open, the completeness assumption, innocent though it may be, remains vulnerable to blame shifting.
Let's look first at the choice that makes less sense. Assuming a great deal of motivation it would remain just possible to continue insisting on the existence of CONCAT.
However, at this late stage it would effectively turn Gödel's Assumption into a postulate, Gödel's Axiom. The Axiom would assert the Assumption; or more generally, formalise assumptions that certain string predicate expressions 7 successfully extensionalise into sets of strings. Through an axiom of this type, simply by taking descriptive expressions at face value, one could force into existence an infinitary string object, a theory in the extensional sense of a set of formal sentences.
Apart from being declared directly, the existence of CONCAT could also be introduced indirectly, by way of other assumptions turned axioms that imply Gödel's. An indirect way could be to approve a method of infinitary construction, or endorse a special notation with the same effect. (The success of constructions, and the non-emptiness of descriptions in a new notation, can only be guaranteed by a postulate.)
The infinitary string object thus created would be custom-made to be unformalisable. A flat set of sentences, unaxiomatised and essentially unaxiomatisable. With the set pretending to contain the otherwise unreachable "truth" about extensional concatenation, we would be provably unable to summarise it by finite axioms, or a finite number of regular schemes. (True, the set might be "recursively enumerable", but recursive enumerability for arbitrary sets of strings that do not follow the pattern of a regular axiom scheme is only another disguise for the Assumption.)
Although possible, we should be clear about what taking this course of action would mean. Because of mutual representability by Gödel numberings and similar techniques it would mean that undecidability comes roaring back for a wide range of theories. Once (re)introduced as CONCAT, it would immediately spread to other theories, including some about as weak as Q.
In the final analysis, to adopt Gödel's Assumption as an axiom would mean postulating essential incompleteness, and all the weirdness it entails, because one considers it to be a desirable state of the world.
Be that as it may, we stand at a fork, with two paths ahead. One is known to exhaustion, the other temptingly unexplored. For what remains of the paper, the stroll home, we will treat the soft contradiction as a hard , and choose to consider Gödel's Assumption refuted.
Gödel's Theorem (3 rd approximation) [6.1]: Extensional concatenation is not formalisable in first-order logic: For any theory T with strings over  for constants, there exists an n and an atomic sentence c(s,t) = u that is decided by T in a different way than it is by CONCATn.
Proof: This is only a statement of the negation of Gödel's Assumption aka 'CONCAT exists'.
Recall that, as a working assumption, CONCAT was defined to be a first-order theory. An obvious line of inquiry would be to ask whether higher orders of the predicate calculus, or other logics, would make any difference. It appears not. Readers are invited to verify that moving up to the second order does not materially change the outcome. The most promising route to an axiomatisation, the trick of quantifying inside terms, violates the standards of any conventional logic, second order as much as first. The presumption becomes that no consistent formalisation exists, in any conceivable type of formalism. To escape the paradox, we conclude that there is no such thing as concatenation extending infinitely far.
Infinitary computing is not feasible. The idea of transcending all perimeters is incoherent. The notion makes no sense.
There is no total c-function, native string relations never were total, there is nothing on the side of the preimage for arithmetic relations to represent. Interpretation fails for all non-finite relations.
The new path continues to understanding that the absence of total string functions is not caused by theories failing to live up to some independent truth. It is caused by the fact that there is nothing to these notions of truth, nothing to formalise in the first place. Fragmented formalisations perfectly express that string reality itself is fragmented.
Although unformalisability will disappear, strange occurrences would not. Extensional string predicates will continue to provoke phenomena that can look superficially similar to the traditional weirdness created by essential incompleteness:
There are fragments that do not assemble into a whole. Fragmented predicates Pn, based on CONCATn, are admitted to exist, but these fragments do not assemble into total predicates P. Finite combinations of Pn and Qm are possible, but, in general, no countably infinite unions.
Definition [6.2]:
For any P(x) from C, let Pn(x) be the expression from C Δ that restricts P(x) to Σ n , i.e. strings over Σ of length ≤ n.
There are approximating sequences that converge over initial ranges, up to the edge of their perimeter, but fail to reach infinity. Specifically, there are diagonal predicates D where for finite N < M we can prove:
...
CONCATN |-x DN(x)
but we still cannot prove x D(x). No CONCATn can prove it for an unrestricted domain; nor would implicit theories of concatenation, where D(x) also forms part of the language. On the contrary, the expectation is that a plausible, sufficiently powerful theory of implicit concatenation would reject x D(x). Extensional concatenation cannot interpret even theories of implicit concatenation.
The inference
is intuitively compelling, but false. Not so much because it is wrong -after all, all strings would eventually get covered by the enumeration -, but because without CONCAT we cannot even state it.
With perimeters properly applied, all we can state is for arbitrarily large M i<M CONCATi |-x Di(x)  x D(x), which is not compelling at all.
One might paraphrase Gödel's assumption as the ability to quantify over perimeters, so that one can coherently speak of " M", or "i CONCATi". This is equivalent to being allowed to enter another line into the enumeration above, after CONCATN |-x DN(x), reading '...'
Definition [6.3]:
Cn is the sublanguage of C consisting of all formulas that contain at most constants over Σ of length ≤ n.
Abbreviate 'strictly axiomatisable, consistent, and complete' to 'stacc'.
.
Proposition [6.4]:
For n < M, if a stacc theory T decides C1, then it has a stacc extension Tn that decides Cn.
Proof: (As our one concession to the readability of concatenation we allow that n-ary Extend T to Tn by adding all atomic concatenation statements that CONCATn proves. Their number is finite, so the extension is still strictly axiomatisable.
To decide any Cn sentence in Tn, translate it into a C1 sentence by replacing all its non-letter constants t by f(t). Equivalence between the formula and its replacement is provable by the rules of identity. Hence Tn is complete.
unformalisability. (This includes also implicit theories of concatenation.) Once we reject Gödel's Assumption, no reason remains for believing in Gödel's original conclusion. Although absence of counterevidence does not constitute evidence, it is only natural to revert to completeness as the default assumption.
The lesson of Gödel's Theorem: Concatenation, used naïvely, can be just as treacherous as the membership relation . So in a way Gödel's argument does for concatenation-based theories what
Russell's paradox does for set theory: For both types of theories, the naïve assumption that all predicate expressions ought to be able to have an extension turns out to be inconsistent despite its overwhelming intuitive appeal.
